

POLS6011: Introduction to Comparative Politics

[View Online](#)

1.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. Principles of comparative politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

2.

Caramani, Danièle. Comparative politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008.

3.

Newton, Kenneth, Deth, Jan W. van. Foundations of comparative politics: democracies of the modern world. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010.

4.

Zuckerman, Alan S., Lichbach, Mark Irving. Comparative politics: rationality, culture, and structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997.

5.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. Principles of comparative politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

6.

Collier D. The Comparative Method. Political Science: The State of Discipline II. American Political Science Association; 1993. p. 105–119.

7.

Collier, David, Brady, Henry E. Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield; 2004.

8.

Gerring J. Case study research: principles and practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007.

9.

Kellstedt, Paul M., Whitten, Guy D. The fundamentals of political science research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009.

10.

King, Gary, Verba, Sidney, Keohane, Robert O. Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1994.

11.

Lijphart A. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review. 1971;65(3):682-693.

12.

Ragin CC. Redesigning social inquiry: fuzzy sets and beyond. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press; 2008.

13.

Shadish, William R., Campbell, Donald T., Cook, Thomas D. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 2002.

14.

Elster J. Chapter 3 - Rational choice. Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989. p. 22–29.

15.

David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon. A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain? *Comparative Politics*. Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York; 1979;11(2):127–145.

16.

March JG, Olsen JP. Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions. *Governance* [Internet]. Oxford : B. Blackwell; 1996 Jul;9(3):247–264. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1996.tb00242.x/abstract>

17.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. *Principles of comparative politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

18.

Green DP, Shapiro I. Chapter 5 - Social dilemmas and free-riding. *Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science*. London: Yale University Press; 1994.

19.

John H. Aldrich. Rational Choice and Turnout. *American Journal of Political Science*. Midwest Political Science Association; 1993;Vol. 37(1):246–278.

20.

Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney. *The Civic culture revisited*. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications; 1989.

21.

David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn. Bargaining in Legislatures. *The American Political Science Review*. American Political Science Association; 1989;83(4):1181–1206.

22.

Downs, Anthony. *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row; 1957.

23.

Elster, Jon. *Rational choice*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 1986.

24.

Elster, Jon. *Nuts and bolts for the social sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989.

25.

Green, Donald P., Shapiro, Ian. *Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science*. London: Yale University Press; 1994.

26.

Inglehart R, Baker WE. Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. *American Sociological Review*. 2000;65(1).

27.

Jackman RW. Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies. *The American Political Science Review*. 1987;81(2).

28.

Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller. A Renaissance of Political Culture? *American Journal of Political Science*. Midwest Political Science Association; 1996;40(3):632–659.

29.

Chalmers Johnson. Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science. *PS: Political Science and Politics*. American Political Science Association; 1997;Vol. 30(2):170–174.

30.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Fuchs, Dieter, Zielonka, Jan. *Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge; 2006.

31.

Leeds BA. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science*. Midwest Political Science Association; 1999 Oct;43(4):979–1002.

32.

North DC. Institutions and Credible Commitment. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* [Internet]. Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG; 1993 Mar;149(1):11–23. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40751576>

33.

North DC, Weingast BR. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History* [Internet]. Economic History Association at the University of Pennsylvania; 1989 Dec;49(04). Available from: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=4161868&fullTextType=RA&fileId=S0022050700009451>

34.

Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. London: Harvard University Press; 1971.

35.

Ostrom E. Coping with tragedies of the commons. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 1999;2(1):493–535.

36.

Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert, Nanetti, Raffaella. *Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy* [Internet]. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1993. Available from:
<https://www.dawsonera.com/guard/protected/dawson.jsp?name=https://shib-idp.ucl.ac.uk/shibboleth&dest=http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9781400820740>

37.

Lucian W. Pye. Political Culture Revisited. *Political Psychology* [Internet]. International Society of Political Psychology; 1991;12(3):487–508. Available from:
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791758>

38.

George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. A Directional Theory of Issue Voting. *The American Political Science Review*. American Political Science Association; 1989;Vol. 83(1):93–121.

39.

William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. *The American Political Science Review*. American Political Science Association; 1968;62(1):25–42.

40.

Shepsle KA. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. *American Journal of Political Science*. Midwest Political Science Association; 1979 Feb;23(1):27–59.

41.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. *Principles of comparative*

politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

42.

Herbst JI. States and power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control. Chichester: Princeton University Press; 2000.

43.

Bates RH. When things fell apart: state failure in late-century Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2008.

44.

Evans P. The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization. World Politics [Internet]. 1997 Oct;50(1):62–87. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054027>

45.

Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Skocpol, Theda. Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985.

46.

Haggard, Stephan, Kaufman, Robert R. The Politics of economic adjustment: international constraints, distributive conflicts, and the state. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1992.

47.

Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. World Politics. Cambridge University Press; 1982;35(1):1–24.

48.

Melleuish G. The State in World History: Perspectives and Problems. Australian Journal of

Politics and History. 2002;48(3):322–335.

49.

Slaughter AM. The Real New World Order. Foreign Affairs. 1997;76(5).

50.

Tilly, Charles. Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992. Revised pbk. ed. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell; 1992.

51.

Vu T. Studying the State through State Formation. World Politics [Internet]. 2010;62(1). Available from:
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6866180&fullTextType=RV&fileId=S0043887109990244>

52.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. Principles of comparative politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

53.

Schmitter PC, Karl TL. What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not. Journal of Democracy. 1991;2(3):75–88.

54.

Collier D, Adcock R. Democracy and dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts. Annual Review of Political Science. 1999 Jun;2(1):537–565.

55.

Boix C. Democracy, Development, and the International System. American Political Science Review. 2011;105(04):809–828.

56.

Cheibub JA, Gandhi J, Vreeland JR. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice*. 2009;143(1-2):67-101.

57.

Dahl, Robert Alan. *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*. London: Yale University Press; 1971.

58.

Diamond LJ. Three Paradoxes of Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*. 1990;1(3):48-60.

59.

Diamond LJ, Morlino L. The Quality of Democracy: An Overview. *Journal of Democracy*. 2004;15(4):20-31.

60.

Munck G, Verkuilen J. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices. *Comparative Political Studies*. 2002;35(1):5-34.

61.

Olson M. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *The American Political Science Review* [Internet]. American Political Science Association; 1993 Sep;87(3):567-576. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736>

62.

Pemstein D, Meserve S, Melton J. Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type. *Political Analysis*. 2010;18(4):426-449.

63.

Schumpeter, Joseph Alois. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. 5th ed. London: Allen and Unwin; 1976.

64.

Barry R. Weingast. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. *The American Political Science Review* [Internet]. American Political Science Association; 1997;91(2):245–263. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952354>

65.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. Principles of comparative politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

66.

Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* [Internet]. Council on Foreign Relations; 1993;72(3):22–49. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045621>

67.

Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2006.

68.

Boix C, Stokes SC. Endogenous Democratization. *World Politics*. 2003;55(04):517–549.

69.

Diamond LJ. Three Paradoxes of Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*. 1990;1(3):48–60.

70.

Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfred C. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1996.

71.

Lipset SM. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*. 1959;53(01):69–105.

72.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Schmitter, Philippe C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. *Transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1986.

73.

Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1991.

74.

Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000.

75.

Rustow DA. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics*. 1970 Apr;2(3).

76.

Svolik M. Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation. *American Political Science Review*. 2008;102(2).

77.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. *Principles of comparative politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

78.

Cheibub JA. Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007.

79.

Druckman JN, Roberts A. Context and Coalition-Bargaining: Comparing Portfolio Allocation in Eastern and Western Europe. *Party Politics*. 2005;11(5):535–555.

80.

Duverger M. A new political system model: semi-presidential government. *European Journal of Political Research* [Internet]. 1980 Jun;8(2):165–187. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00569.x/abstract>

81.

Laver, Michael, Schofield, Norman. *Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1998.

82.

Lijphart A. Power-sharing versus Majority Rule: Patterns of Cabinet Formation in Twenty Democracies. *Government and Opposition*. 1981;16(4):395–413.

83.

Lijphart A. *Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. London: Yale University Press; 1999.

84.

Linz, Juan J. (Juan José). The Perils of Presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*. 1990;1(1):51–69.

85.

Sartori G. Comparative constitutional engineering: an inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes. 2nd ed. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press; 1997.

86.

Siaroff A. Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. *European Journal of Political Research* [Internet]. 2003;42(3):287–312. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.00084/abstract>

87.

Strom K. Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions. *Comparative Political Studies*. 1984;17(2):199–227.

88.

Paul V. Warwick and James N. Druckman. Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments. *British Journal of Political Science* [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 2001;31(4):627–649. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593295>

89.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. *Principles of comparative politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

90.

Immergut EM. The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical Effect of a Political Institution. *Scandinavian Political Studies*. 2002 Sep;25(3):231–257.

91.

Cox, Gary W. *Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997.

92.

Horowitz DL. Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers. *Journal of Democracy* [Internet]. 2003;14(4):115–127. Available from: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/195554884/C10D89C4FD5548A1PQ/11?accountid=14511>

93.

Lijphart A. *Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. London: Yale University Press; 1999.

94.

Norris, Pippa. *Electoral engineering: voting rules and political behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004.

95.

Reynolds A, Reilly B, Ellis A, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. *Electoral system design: the new international IDEA handbook*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; 2005.

96.

William H. Riker. *The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law*. *Comparative Politics*. Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York; 1976;9(1):93–106.

97.

Sartori G. *Comparative constitutional engineering: an inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*. 2nd ed. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press; 1997.

98.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. *Principles of comparative politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

99.

North DC, Weingast BR. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History* [Internet]. Economic History Association at the University of Pennsylvania; 1989 Dec;49(04). Available from: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=4161868&fullTextType=RA&fileId=S0022050700009451>

100.

Clarke G, Beck T, Keefer P, Groff A, Walsh P, Bank W. New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions [Internet]. World Bank Publications; 1999. Available from: <http://www.worldbank.icebox.ingenta.com/content/wb/wps4301/1999/00000001/00000001/art02283>

101.

Gehlbach S, Malesky EJ. The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform. *The Journal of Politics*. 2010;72(04):957–975.

102.

Hallerberg M, Basinger S. Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players. *Comparative Political Studies*. 1998;31(3):321–352.

103.

Henisz WJ. *Politics and international investment: measuring risks and protecting profits*. Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar; 2002.

104.

KEEFER P, STASAVAGE D. The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. *American Political Science Review*. 2003;97(03).

105.

Stasavage D. Private Investment and Political Institutions. *Economics and Politics*. 2002;14(1):41-63.

106.

Tsebelis G. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science* [Internet]. Cambridge University Press; 1995 Jul;25(03). Available from: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3279628&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0007123400007225>

107.

Tsebelis G. Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis. *The American Political Science Review* [Internet]. American Political Science Association; 1999 Sep;93(3). Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585576>

108.

Tsebelis G, Russell Sage Foundation. *Veto players: how political institutions work*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 2002.

109.

Clark, William Roberts, Golder, Matt, Golder, Sona Nadenichek. *Principles of comparative politics*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; 2009.

110.

Gandhi J, Przeworski A. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*. 2007;40(11):1279-1301.

111.

Malesky E, Schuler P. The Single-Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 2011;36(4):491-530.

112.

Brooker, Paul. Non-democratic regimes. Revised and updated 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2009.

113.

Brzezinski Z. Totalitarianism and Rationality. The American Political Science Review. 1956;50(3).

114.

Gandhi, Jennifer. Political institutions under dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2008.

115.

Geddes B. What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual Review of Political Science. 1999;2(1):115–144.

116.

Lai B, Slater D. Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992. American Journal of Political Science. 2006;50(1):113–126.

117.

Levitsky S, Way L. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy. 2002;13(2):51–65.

118.

Malesky E, Schuler P. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. American Political Science Review. 2010;104(3):482–502.

119.

Schedler, Andreas. Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers; 2006.

120.

Milan W. Svolik. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2012.

121.

Wintrobe, Ronald. The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998.

122.

Wright J. Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment. American Journal of Political Science. 2008;52(2):322–343.